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Non-technical summary
Globalization  can be hard to define, but that doesn't mean that  it
doesn't  exist.  The paper assumes that there is some kind  of  step
change in the world order, although discussing its nature and extent
is not the objective of this paper.
What  the  paper  does do is examine critically the  stance  of  the
comparative  political  economy school, as particularly  represented
by  a recent book edited by Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck.  This
book   represents  an  attempt  to  revitalise  an  approach   which
emphasises  the  ways  in  which national differences  can  help  or
hinder  the  international competitiveness of a particular  country.
Crouch  and  Streeck are worried that American forms  of  capitalism
will  displace  German  forms of capitalism through the  effects  of
globalization.
Their  analysis  is  in many ways a well argued one, but  the  whole
emphasis  is  on institutions. One would not think  that  individual
entrepreneurs  like  Richard  Branson had  ever  achieved  anything.
Crouch  and Streeck seem to take the view that firms compete through
the benevolence of their governments.
They  also  underestimate the importance of new  governing  entities
below  and above the level of the nation state. Policies to  promote
skill  formation or nurture high value added activities can often be
done  most effectively at a subnational level. The European Union is
mentioned  very  little  in  their analysis and when  it  is  rather
negatively  - seemingly because it can't replicate the German way of
doing  things  on  a European scale. No one denies that there  is  a
paradox  at  the  heart  of  the  EU  because  it  both  facilitates
globalization and tries to offer social protection from its effects.
Peter  Hall's  analysis of organized market economies is seen  as  a
more   fruitful  approach,  if  only  because  he  recognizes  to  a
greater  extent than Crouch and Streeck the weaknesses of  organized
market   economies.  They  may,  he  admits,  slow  down   necessary
processes  of  adaptation and change. Even Germany cannot go in  the
same  way, but it may be able to preserve the essential features  of
its model while making necessary changes.
It  is evident that globalization presents national governments with
a  challenge  in  managing  their economic policies:  they  have  to
promise  economic success to voters, but can they still deliver?  It
is  argued  that  the  Blair  Government in  Britain  has  shown  an
awareness  of the limits of what they can do, but also of the limits
of  autonomous  action. They have been politically astute,  although
they   have  to  walk  a  tightrope  between  fiscal  restraint  and
delivering on promises of better schools and hospitals.
There  is  a democratic deficit at the global level,  but  attention
should be focussed on this and on new regional and subnational forms
of  government  rather  than seeking to shore up the  resistance  of
existing national models to change.
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Globalization  and  comparative  political economy  offer  different
perspectives  on  the  analysis of developments in  world  political
economy.  One does not have to accept the extreme pronouncements  of
writers  like  Ohmae  (1990) to recognise that  globalization  is  a
phenomenon  which  has the potential to reduce the significance  and
autonomy  of  the nation state. Globalization is understood in  this
paper  as  a  continuing process which reduces the  significance  of
national  boundaries  as  an  impediment to  the  free  movement  of
capital,  labour,  goods  and services. Barriers  have  particularly
diminished  in the international capital market and remain generally
high  in  relation to labour migration, but the general  picture  is
clear.  Indeed,  the  fact that the definition of  globalization  is
sometimes  imprecise  is a rather poor argument for  dismissing  the
significance of the phenomenon.
A  recurrent theme in both the literature and more popular  accounts
is  that globalization represents nothing new, that at most it is an
acceleration  of a movement towards greater economic integration and
interdependence  that  has been taking place over a long  period  of
time.  Thus,  for  example, Vandenbroucke argues, 'A  cool  look  at
globalisation  reveals  no significant new and hard  economic  facts
behind   the   replacement  of  the  traditional   expression   "the
international  econoomy"  by "the global economy."'  (Vandenbroucke,
1998,  p.30).  The purpose of this paper is not to argue whether  or
not globalization represents a paradigm shift in the organization of
the  world  economy  rather  than, say,  an  acceleration  along  an
existing  path. Nevertheless, the assumption is made that  something
significant  is happening and that, for example, the replacement  of
GATT by the World Trade Organization does represent a step change in
the  organization of the international trading regime. However,  the
focus   here  is  on  responses  to  the  perceived  phenomenon   of
globalization,  rather  than  debating whether or not  a  meaningful
change  has occurred. Certainly, this paper does not subscribe to  a
new  form  of economic determinism which argues that there  is  only
one, liberal path which the world economy can follow.
5The comparative political economy approach
The  comparative political economy approach emphasises the diversity
of  environments  which nation states provide for  their  economies.
The  term  'approach'  is  used deliberately  as  different  authors
provide  a  range  of  models within the  general  orientation.  The
underlying   argument,  however,  is  that  different  institutional
environments  and different national policy paths have a discernible
impact  on the competitiveness of firms based in a particular nation
state.  When  this literature enjoyed its finest hour in the  1980s,
the  implicit case being made was that countries with relatively low
levels of institutional development would benefit from becoming more
like  those who had dense institutional networks. Thus, the American
'declinist'  literature  suggested  that the  United  States  should
attempt  to  learn from Japan. At its crudest and most  banal,  this
degenerated  into a call for an American 'MITI' (although some would
say  it already existed in the Department of Defense).  Institutions
do  not easily transfer from one setting to another and it was  more
consistent  with a true 'requisite variety' position to suggest that
Americans  should  try to adhere to their own values and  strengths.
(Fallows, 1989) Some of the other distinctive institutional settings
which  were discovered by expeditions of social scientists (such  as
the 'Third Italy') turned out on closer scrutiny to be more complex,
flawed  and  limited  than the first dispatches  received  suggested
(Nuti  and  Cainelli, 1996) and not always well placed to cope  with
internationalization (Tamisari, 1997).
In  the 1990s, the American economy has been restored to new heights
of  prosperity and even Britain has not done so badly while  Germany
has  struggled  with  high  unemployment and  Japan  with  financial
crisis and the new and unwelcome experience of appreciable levels of
unemployment.  Faced with the apparent dominance of what they saw as
an   uncritical  neo-liberalism  comparative  political   economists
convened at two conferences in France in 1994 under the aegis of the
Andrew  Shonfield  Association. Following on from these  conference,
the   capitalist  diversity  model  is  re-visited,  re-stated   and
re-assessed  in a recent volume with contributions from some of  the
leading figures in this field (Crouch and Streeck, 1997). This paper
also  offers a discussion of an analysis by Hall which, although  in
the  same  comparative  political economy family, takes  a  somewhat
different - and, it is argued, more convincing - direction.
6Interestingly,  the Crouch and Streeck volume contains a  dissenting
chapter   by   Susan  Strange  (1997)  who  herself  played  a   not
insignificant  role  in the emergence of Shonfield's  classic  work.
(Shonfield  1964). In the past, the present writer has had some walk
on  parts  in the comparative political economy  literature  (Grant,
1989).  However,  with the millennium only two years away, the  time
has come for a complete change of kit. A new orientation was already
presaged  in an earlier paper on the stateless firm. (Grant,  1992).
That  is  not  to say that this paper writes off  the  nation-state.
There have been too many premature obituaries. It still has a lot of
life  left  in yet, particularly in the area of what may be  broadly
termed social welfare.
The objectives of this paper
This  paper seeks to fulfill a number of tasks. First, it presents a
short  summary  of  the  arguments put forward by  Streeck  and  his
colleagues.   Second,   it   attempts  to  identify  a   number   of
deficiencies  in  their  work. In particular, it is  suggested  that
rather  than  their argument that 'I have seen the future and it  is
bleak', a more appropriate line might be 'I have seen the future and
it  is  complex'.  It is also suggested that Streeck  in  particular
underestimates the significance of the European Union because it has
disappointed  him by not replicating the German economic and  social
settlement  on  a  European  scale.  Third, it  looks  at  the  work
undertaken   by  Hall  which  has  proceeded  on  the  basis  of   a
collaboration   with   Soskice.  (Hall,  1997;  Hall  and   Soskice,
forthcoming).  The final part of the paper looks at the approach  to
economic  policy  of the Blair Government in Britain and shows  that
they  have made a shrewd calculation of what is and is not  possible
in  an era of globalization. The paper concludes by suggesting  that
both  Crouch  and  Streeck and Strange have identified  the  crucial
question:  what  transnational forms of governance can be  found  to
substitute for the nation-state?
The Crouch-Streeck line
Wolfgang  Streeck  has  had a long and distinguished  career  as  an
analyst  of  modern  capitalism with a particular  emphasis  on  the
virtues  of the German model. His empirical work has focussed on the
automobile  industry,  trade  unions  and  business  interests.  His
co-editor  and co-author, Colin Crouch, is an acknowledged expert on
industrial  relations  and  someone  who  has  long  emphasized  the
7deficiencies    of   the   Anglo-American   model   of   capitalism.
Consistency,  coherence  and intellectual rigour are great  virtues,
but the price paid can be a lack of intellectual flexibility.
Crouch  and Streeck's opening chapter is a tour de force. One  might
expect  the cast members of Third Rock from the Sun to be seen  with
it  as part of the essential reading recommended for any aliens on a
study visit to earth. The essence of the Crouch and Streeck argument
is simple: the capacity of the nation state to sustain institutional
diversity  is  being  eroded by globalization and this is  not  good
news.  As they put it the processes of globalization are likely  'to
favour  those  national capitalisms that have in the past done  with
comparatively  little  state intervention, over those  institutional
economies  that  required a high level of  state-mediated  political
organization,  thereby  affecting  the relative  competitiveness  of
alternative performance patterns.' Capitalist economies will tend to
converge on 'an institutional monoculture of deregulated markets and
hierarchies,  thereby  reducing the overall diversity  of  available
governance  arrangements  and  potentially  causing a  net  loss  in
overall economic performance.' (Crouch and Streeck , 1997, p.13).
Since  this last point is one of their strongest ones and central to
their  argument, their case requires a little more attention. Crouch
and Streeck argue (1997, p.15):
   To  the  extent  that national or other  specificities  serve  as
   niches  allowing  firms and economies to develop competitive  new
   products  and  processes,  their disapperance must  diminish  the
   aggregate  entrepreneurial creativity and vitality of  capitalism
   as  a  system.  It  is  further  highly  unlikely  that  any  one
   approach  to running a capitalist economy will monpolize all  the
   virtues  - which would seem to offer good ... reasons for seeking
   to  preserve the innovative potential inherent in a healthy level
   of 'socio-diversity' within global capitalism.
In  his  chapter on Germany, Streeck expresses his fears  with  even
greater  clarity.  Globalization is seen as eroding  the  conditions
for   market   modifying   political  intervention,   leaving   only
depoliticized   and   market   driven  forms  of   economic   order.
Streeck   makes  clear  his  distaste for  the  'anarchic  world  of
international  politics', which certainly does not offer the kind of
regulated Ordnungspolitik favoured in Germany. Globalization favours
'national  systems like those of the USA and Britain. This will lead
8to  the 'perverse outcome of the less well-performing Anglo-American
model   of  capitalism  outcompetng  the  better  performing  "Rhine
model"'. (Streeck, 1997, p.53).
The limits of the analysis
This  claim  that  the Rhine model has a better  performance  record
could  be the subject of a book by itself, but it cannot go entirely
unchallenged.  Part  of the problem is that any assessment  involves
value  judgements: does one prefer an economy like the United States
which   creates  many  jobs,  but  often  at  low  wages  and   with
considerable  overall  social  inequality; or does  one  prefer  the
German  approach  of high wage jobs, relatively low inequality,  but
high  unemployment  (albeit  partly the consequence  of  unification
which  plays a central role in Streeck's account; Hall also mentions
the need to meet EMU convergence criteria).
Britain comes in for particular criticism, and in many ways it is an
easy  target. Graham in his chapter provides a trenchant account  of
what  is seen as the failure of Conservative capitalism. Of  course,
Britain   has   a   long   record  of   relatively   poor   economic
performance  under  a variety of policy regimes. A spokesman in  the
House  of  Commons is once said to have remarked,  'Every  available
policy  option  in  this country has been tried at least  once,  and
every  option  has  failed', bringing the retort  from  the  benches
opposite, 'including you'.
One  hesitates to challenge an analyst and practitioner with such  a
distinguished  record  as  Graham. However, it is  interesting  that
Crafts  is cited in the introduction as an economist sympathetic  to
institutional  perspectives.  One  hesitates to summarise  the  rich
oeuvre that Crafts has produced on the Thatcher Government. However,
in  terms  of  stylised facts his analysis runs as  follows:  policy
mistakes  were  made,  particularly  in terms of a  failure  to  act
sufficiently quickly on education and training. However, compared to
past   performance,  manufacturing  productivity  improved,  as  did
overall  macroecnomic performance. In part this can be attributed to
the  removal  of  the veto power of the unions and  the  constraints
placed  on  management.  (Bean and Crafts, 1996; Crafts,  1997).  In
other  words, British economic performance may not be good after the
marketization of the economy, but it is no worse than it was, and in
some respects is better.
9One of the difficulties with the analysis presented in the volume is
that  it  is completely focussed on institutional factors. The  role
of  the  individual entrepreneur is completely ignored. There is  no
room  for the Richard Bransons or the Alan Sugars of this world.  As
Strange  points out, 'The success of the economy does indeed  depend
heavily  on quick responses, on adaptability and competitive  costs.
But  these are attributes of corporate management, not of government
officials   or  politicians.'  (Strange,  1997,  p.184).  As  Porter
observes,  'Firms,  not nations, compete in international  markets.'
(Porter,  1990, p.33). The perspective in this book seems to be that
firms   and  entrepreneurs  are  allowed  to  compete  through   the
benevolence  of  their  governments and other  social  institutions.
Nothing  can  be created outside the mantle of the state  and  other
social  institutions.  If  Richard  Branson had wanted  to  start  a
business  in Germany, he would have probably have to have obtained a
Handwerk  qualification  and would then have found that the  opening
hours of his shops were restricted.
Below and above the nation state
In  the world of Crouch and Streeck, 'the politics that was supposed
to   generate  capitalist  diversity  was  national.'  (Crouch   and
Streeck,  1997,  p.2).  As a consequence, Strange notes  that  'they
are   still   looking   within  national  societies   for   possible
alternatives   to  government  intervention  to  modify  the  social
consequences   of  global  economic  integration.'  (Strange,  1997,
p.182).  But  perhaps  Crouch and Streeck are looking in  the  wrong
place  for  the  holy grail of capitalist  diversity:  perhaps  they
should be looking above and below the nation state.
We  live  in  a period which seeks to give political  expression  to
subnational  identities. Whether the transaction costs of federal or
quasi-federal  systems  are  less than the political  benefits  they
bring  is  a  question beyond the scope of this paper. What  is  not
surprising  is  that one reaction to globalization is to cling  even
closer  to very specific local identities. For example, the  rebirth
of Scottish identity has come at a time when the Scottish economy is
more under international control than ever before.
Scotland  has, however, shown an ability to nurture high value added
products  in specific market niches, e.g., specialist woollen  goods
or  particular  branches of food processing. The  'Scottishness'  of
these  goods  is often used to market them: note, for  example,  the
10
advertising  campaigns  of the food processing firm, Baxters,  which
uses  family members both to stress family ownership and control and
the  distinctive  Scottish  character of the  products.  A  Scottish
legislature and executive is well placed to nurture such activities.
For  example, it can protect and develop the distinctive and in some
ways superior Scottish education system thus enhancing human capital
formation.
The  subnational  dimension is largely neglected in the  Crouch  and
Streeck volume, somewhat surprisingly given that in the introduction
they  state  that  'economic governance regimes  will  vary  between
subnational  regions'. (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.16). The role of
banks  owned  by  Land  governments in  providing  funds  for  small
businesses  is acknowledged (Pontusson, 1997, p.63), but  federalism
is  seen  as  a constraint that differentiates Germany  from  Sweden
(Pontusson,   1997,  p.61).  In  Streeck's  account,  federalism  is
presented  principally  as  'an extensive redistributive  system  of
revenue  sharing.'  (Streeck,  1997, p.38). Distinctive  Land  level
experiments in high technology policy are ignored.
It is not being suggested that Europe is going to become a patchwork
quilt of capitalist diversities nurtured by subnational governments.
However,  the  subnational dimension does repay some  attention.  In
some ways, the most intriguing possibility is that emergent regional
identities  which  cut across national boundaries will  become  more
important   and  provided  the  basis  for  some  kind  of  publicly
sanctioned collective action.  (Grant, 1997, p.218).
The European Union
The  single  biggest  criticism  to be made  of  the  Crouch-Streeck
analysis  is  that  it downplays the potential significance  of  the
European  Union. The European Union is discussed surprisingly little
in  the  book and when it is mentioned, the perspective taken  is  a
rather  negative one. Put at its most simplest, the argument of  the
book's  editors is that the quasi-state of the European Union  lacks
the  capacity  both to create or protect capitalist diversity or  to
offer  European  citizens social protection. They are  not  claiming
that  governance  institutions are absent in Europe, but  that  they
'will  probably lack the specific "market distorting" capacities  of
the  traditional European nation-state.' (Crouch and Streeck,  1997,
p.12).  They  are  also concerned that 'the failure to  establish  a
European state capacity would seem to be particularly devastating to
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the  social  base of the European economies.' (Crouch  and  Streeck,
1997, p.14).
Streeck  makes it clear that in his view, 'the European  quasi-state
has  no capacity to provide for equalization of living conditions in
its  territorial subunits.' (Streeck, 1997, p.52). His view is  that
German  'efforts  to  endow  the  Internal  Market  with  a  "social
dimension",  in  alliance with the French and against  the  British,
came  to naught.' (Streeck, 1997, p.51). From a British perspective,
this  observation seems rather strange. The much argued about Social
Chapter   has  a  largely  symbolic  importance,  but  the  European
Commission, largely supported by the Court of Justice, has sought to
extend the rights and protections of European workers. The resultant
arrangements  undoubtedly  full well short of what Germany has  been
able  to  provide,  as one might expect given  both  the  dispartity
between  German GDP per capita and that of most other member states,
and   the   necessary  compromises  forged  in  what  is  still   an
intergovernmental   bargaining   process   more  often   that   not.
Nevertheless, the European social space is more than a lowest common
denominator  and  contains  elements of 'levelling up'  as  well  as
'levelling down', e.g., legislation on working hours.
There  is, of course, a paradox at the heart of the European  Union.
On  the  one hand, it clearly facilitates globalization by  removing
barriers  to  capital  and  trade  at  a  regional  level.  American
multinational  companies have been strongly represented  politically
at  the  EU level. On the other hand, it seeks to  offer  protection
against  globalization  by  creating a distinctive  European  social
space.  The arena in which the EU has done this most successfully is
that  of  agriculture, albeit at a somewhat high price in  terms  of
budgetary  expenditure,  the  cost to consumers  and,  perhaps  most
serious  of all, the ability of European food products to compete on
international  markets.  The  experience of the CAP  does  at  least
demonstrate  that the EU is able to offer social protection. Indeed,
as  the  competitive pressures from trade liberalization  intensify,
the  EU  is  asserting even more strongly the distinctiveness  of  a
European agricultural model.
The  European  project  has always been  concerned  with  countering
American hegemony, and as Strange emphasises:
   There  is  a  growing  asymmetry of regulatory  power  among  the
   governments of capitalist enterprises.  The government of the USA
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   exercises  a  global reach over enterprises and markets in  other
   countries.   It  is  a  global  reach  unmatched  by  any   other
   government.  (Strange, 1997, p,.189).
In a post-cold war era where G1 solutions may seem attractive to the
United  States, the European Union has the ability (and the duty) to
assert  that there are other voices to be heard in the  organization
of  world regulatory space. This has to be done with some  political
skill  if  one is not to play into the hands of the 'America  First'
tendency  that  is so prominent in the US Congress. The EU did  play
its  hand  quite  well in the Uruguay Round  negotiations,  although
perhaps  its  greatest success was defending the CAP. The  EU  needs
more  strategic  focus  in  the way it which  handles  its  external
relations  and  it needs a clearer definition of what  the  European
position in the world economy is, beyond protecting marginal farmers
or French language films.
Old  style social regulation of the heavy handed German kind is  not
going  to survive or, if it does, Europe will not be able to compete
effectively  in  the world economy. That does not mean  that  Europe
should  neglect  its social dimension or try and create an  American
economy  in  which  valet service is always available for  your  car
whether you want it or not. Young business leaders at the 1998 Davos
forum claimed that it was the social system not the economy that had
broken  down  in Europe, with the burden of unemployment carried  by
the  weakest  individuals  such as the young. (Financial  Times,  31
January 1998).
What  we  face  is a more complex world than that envisaged  by  the
comparative  political  economists and hence one that requires  more
political  sophistication to manage it. 'The "global" economy is ...
a  complex and often contradictory story of global markets, national
development  strategies, regional dynamics, and competing  corporate
strategies.'  (Borrus and Zysman, 1997, p.143). Capitalist diversity
of  a kind that gives real competitive advantage will be nurtured at
three  levels.  The European Union has a strategic role in  defining
and  defending the nature of the European economic and social space.
Nation  states will continue to have an important role in  education
and  training and hence in human capital formation. If  arrangements
like  the German Handwerk or the Italian artisanal associations  are
superior   in  these  and  other  areas,  then  their  institutional
distinctiveness  need  not  be  threatened.  Finally,  there  is  an
important  role for the subnational level, particularly in marketing
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and  maintaining quality standards for distinctive high value  added
products.
The organized market economy model
Peter Hall of Harvard University is one of the best known figures in
the   field   of  comparative  political  economy.  The   discussion
presented  here  will  rely  on a paper presented  at  the  eleventh
International  Conference  of Europeanists in Baltimore in  February
1998  (Hall,  1998), but also on a contribution to the WZB  Jahrbuch
(Hall,  1997).  The Baltimore paper is a draft and  Hall  emphasizes
that  his answers are 'tentative'. Nevertheless, there are a  number
of inviting aspects to his approach which merit discussion.
Hall  draws  a  distinction  between liberal  and  organized  market
economies  (following  Soskice, the term used in the 1997  piece  is
'coordinated  market  economies').  In  comparing  these  models  he
recognizes  that  'There  are  some  significant  differences  among
nations  that  might be described as coordinated or  liberal  market
economies; and, within any one of them, some firms will find ways of
pursuing   corporate  strategies  that  the  overall   institutional
structure  does not seem to encourage. ' (Hall, 1997, p.8). However,
an overall stylized comparison is appropriate in terms of moving the
debate  forward  and Hall is interested in the particular  strengths
and  weaknesses of these different economic models and  specifically
in  the question of whether they the organized market economies  can
secure   lower  levels  of  unemployment  without  abandoning  their
economic   model   altogether.  In  developing  his   argument,   he
acknowledges his debt to models offered by Soskice.
In  Hall's  approach,  the  idea  of a  liberal  market  economy  is
reasonably  equated  with an Anglo-American model. He sees the  idea
of  the  organized market economy having evolved over time with  its
roots  in  the  debate about neo-corporatism  and  coordinated  wage
bargaining.  However,  Hall  shrewdly moves beyond  this  particular
label which has often seemed to obscure as much as it has clarified.
The  liberal market economy seeks to deal with coordination problems
through  competitive  market mechanisms and  short-term  contractual
relations.  Such economies are 'generally characterized by a  system
of  corporate  governance  in which owners or providers  of  finance
remain  distant  from the development of corporate strategy and  use
fluctuations  in the share price of the firm as the principal  basis
for  their  investment decisions.' (Hall, 1997, p.7). The  organized
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market  economy  'is  defined by the extensive degree  to  which  it
relies  on institutions other than market mechanisms to resolve  the
coordination problems facing firms.' (Hall, 1998, p.3). For example,
suppliers  of  finance  may  be involved  in  corporate  governance,
providing  sources  of  finance 'that do not turn  on  share-price.'
(Hall, 1997, p.8).
Hall  recognizes  to  a greater extent than the Crouch  and  Streeck
authors  the  weaknesses  of an organized market  economy  approach.
Redeployment  of resources in such an economy may take place  rather
slowly  because it involves renegotiation with multiple actors. As a
consequence,  such  economies  'have generally been  slow  to  shift
resources  across  sectors and into new sectors ... in this  respect
the  structural  framework  of a liberal market economy  seems  more
propitious.' (Hall, 1998, p.16). One might add that a global economy
may  have  the  effect  of increasing the  pace  of  change,  facing
organized market economies with new and difficult dilemmas.
Hall  presents an extended discussion of globalization, arguing that
it  has had particularly strong effects on western Europe. What is a
little  surprising  is his definition of globalization 'as a set  of
processes  that  have  made  it  more  feasible  and  desirable  for
companies  to  locate  at least some of  their  operations  abroad.'
(Hall,  1998,  p.16). This paper has preferred a broader  definition
of  globalization  and finds Hall's definition  rather  restrictive.
Hall's  subsequent  discussion,  although  stimulating,  has  rather
different  concerns  from  those of this paper. He  does  call  into
question 'the presumption that the business community of each nation
will automatically press the state for greater deregulation in order
to  cope  with globalization.' (Hall, 1998, p.19). While  'pressures
for  deregulation may come from some quarters, there is likely to be
substantial  resistance  to it from large segments of  the  business
community.'  (Hall,  1997,  p.11). Thus, his discussion  of  Germany
leads  him to the conclusion that 'fears that Germany will be forced
to  adopt  an Amglo-Saxon economic model are  greatly  exaggerated.'
(Hall, 1997, p.21).
The  subsequent analysis of Britain presented here suggests that  it
may  be the politicians who are the key actors. This is not  because
they  are following any particular set of demands from the  business
community,  but  either because their judgement is affected by  what
they  believe  to  be  the siren voices of  globalization  or,  more
likely, because globalization offers them an alibi for administering
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unpleasant  medicine  in the social sphere which they would wish  to
use anyway.
There  are  three points in Hall's analysis which  are  particularly
persuasive.  First,  there is his acceptance that  organized  market
economies  do have some weaknesses and problems. Second, he  accepts
that  some  changes  must follow in a  changed  global  environment:
'These  economies will certainly be called upon to make  significant
adjustments  in  their  regulatory  regimes in the  context  of  the
dramatic  changes taking place in the international economy.' (Hall,
1998, p.25). Third, and most intriguingly, he suggests that it would
be  possible  to bring about selective deregulation without  setting
organized   market   economies  on  the  slippery  slope   to   full
deregulation.  In  the  German  case, although  'I  have  identified
several respects in which the institutional structures of the German
political  economy  will  come under strain ... there is  reason  to
believe  that  these structures can accommodate some change  without
losing any of their distinctive strengths.'  (Hall, 1997, p. 21).
Streeck  would  argue that this could be done without unravelling  a
normative  consensus based on income equalization. Hall thinks  that
some  change  could  be  possible  without  damaging  the  intricate
processes  of  non-market  coordination on  which  organized  market
economies depend. He believes that 'these coordination processes may
be  more  robust,  in the face of international  pressure  and  some
deregulation,  than  we  often  suppose.' (Hall,  1998,  p.25).  His
approach  might  be characterized as both more optimistic  and  more
realistic  than  that  of Streeck in particular and he  offers  some
interesting   arguments   which   merit   further   discussion   and
investigation.
The political dilemma of national governments
According  to  the Crouch-Streeck model, national  governments  face
some  difficult  dilemmas  in attempting to  manage  their  economic
policies.  In  essence,  they  still  have  to  promise,  but  their
capacity  to  deliver  has been significanty reduced.  'Hesitant  to
reveal  to  their voters the dirty secret that it is no longer  they
who   determine   their   country's  economic   policies,   national
governments  must  somehow  manage to extract  from  the  democratic
process  policies  that  conform  to the "general  will"  of  global
capitalism:  the will of "the markets"'. (Crouch and Streeck,  1997,
p.11).
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The  general  argument  that  will  made  here  is  that  the  Blair
Government  is  handling  the political challenge  of  globalization
rather  well.  It  must be emphasized that what is  being  discussed
here  is  overall strategy rather than particular  policy  decisions
(such  as that to rule out membership of EMU for the lifetime of the
current  Parliament which seems to have driven by political  factors
rather than economic considerations).
Above all, the Blair Government has shown an awareness of the limits
of  what  they can do, but also of the possibilities for  autonomous
action.  They do perhaps have one advantage over some other national
governments  in  that they do not face 'a potentially  destabilizing
"democracy  illusion"  among  citizens,  to the  extent  that  these
continue  to  expect  national  politics to  offer  them  protection
against  market forces.' (Crouch and Streeck, 1997, p.10). The Blair
Government  has  been  handed an economy in which  the  overwhelming
majority  of inefficient firms and sectors are no longer in business
and  in which the public no longer expects, as it did in the  1970s,
that government will bail out businesses in trouble. The public does
have  expectations  in  relation to social welfare which  are  of  a
rather  different  and potentially more troublesome kind,  and  this
point will be returned to later.
The   rather  favourable  interpretation  of  the  Blair  Government
presented  here  is not a partisan one. Partisanship is  best  saved
for  the  more important activity of football, but in so far as  the
writer  has  any political views they are not 'new Labour'. What  is
being  presented  here is an analytical perspective  which  suggests
that   a   successful  national  economic  policy  in  an   era   of
globalization should have the following features:
1. It should be based on an ideology which embraces the intellectual
and political supremacy of market forces.
2. This ideology should be translated into actions which demonstrate
a proper respect for market forces.
3.  Citizens should nevertheless be offered some protection  against
the harsher consequences of the market.
The Blair Government meets all three conditions and has been able to
wrap   up   its  overall  approach  to  policy  in  a  rhetoric   of
'modernisation'  which  it  is very difficult to  challenge  without
appearing  to  be a defender of all that is archaic in  Britain.  It
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has  pressed  on with constitutional reform which offers  the  great
advantage  of  being simultaneously modern and inexpensive.  It  has
also  been able to weave other images such as 'cool Britannia' which
are  essentially devoid of any real content. (For a critique of  the
Blair vision of modernity see Cockett, 1997).
This  is  not to say that the government has no vulnerabilities.  It
has  met  some  presentational problems and finds  it  difficult  to
adjust  to the fact that a government is open to much more  critical
media  scrutiny than an opposition. Sometimes the sophistication  of
its  spin  doctoring has been self defeating. It also has  a  strong
streak  of social authoritarianism which at the moment seems in tune
with  the electorate but carries with it some risks if it is  pushed
too far.
These matters have to be mentioned to paint the broader picture, but
they  are  not the focus of this paper. What needs to  be  discussed
here  is  the way in which the three conditions outlined above  have
been  met  by the Blair Government. Before doing this, it  should be
noted  that the government inherited an economy which was recognized
by  impartial  observers  as doing well. By 1996 the UK was  in  the
fifth  year  of  an economic recovery based on low inflation  and  a
moderate  but  steady  growth rate. Fifteen years  of  microeconomic
reform  had  made the UK economy more flexible and  competitive  and
less prone to inflation. (OECD, 1996).
New Labour adjusts to globalization
Labour's   policy   adjustments  were  not  necessarily  driven   by
globalization  per  se.  In  large  part they  were  a  response  to
domestic   imperatives  which  meant  that  electoral  success   was
perceived  to  be dependant on the party's ability to  differentiate
itself from 'old Labour'.
'New  Labour' certainly showed itself able to embrace the philosophy
of the market.  Blair's analysis starts from the belief that:
   The  determining  context  of economic policy is the  new  global
   market.  That  imposes  huge limitations of  a  practical  nature
   ... on macroeconomic policies.  (Financial Times, 22 May 1995).
As  Blair made clear in his defining statement on economic policy in
the  1995 Mais Lecture, 'The room for manoeuvre of any government in
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Britain  is already heavily circumscribed.' (Financial Times, 23 May
1995).  Given  that Blair apparently views globalization as  both  a
normative   and  empirical  imperative,  what  is  there  left   for
government  to  do in the the sphere of economic policy? The  report
from  the  Commission  on  Public Policy,  closely  associated  with
leading figures in the Labour Party, argues that:
   In a market economy, companies are the engine of wealth creation,
   but  government has a supportive and collaborative role to  play.
   (Commission on Public Policy, 1997, p.2).
Prime  Minister Blair elaborated his own views of what he saw as the
three  key  tasks for 'centre-left' governments in his meeting  with
President Clinton in February 1998:
   One was that, as a result of globalization, it was essential that
   domestic  governments  held  to  fiscal  and  monetary  prudence.
   Second, that there was a role for government, but that was not in
   extensive   economic  regulation  but  in  empowerment  with  the
   equipment  of the individual to make the markets operate  better.
   Thirdly,  that  we  have to construct a tax  and  benefit  system
   which  was  soumd  and  which helped to make  work  pay.  (Senior
   British Official, 1998, p.1).
'Empowering  the individual to make markets work better': this is  a
very  different language from that used by the comparative political
economists.  It  is  interesting how Blair uses the  phrase  'really
successful businessman' as an accolade of high praise and how he has
been  keen to associate himself with entrepreneurs, figures that are
absent  from  the  landscape painted by  the  comparative  political
economists which is littered with associations, networks and various
bodies  endowed  with  public authority by the state.  It  has  been
suggested that he is particularly close to American trained business
persons and that Britain has never had a government so well disposed
to  big  business.  As Blair made clear in his speech  to  the  1997
Labour  conference,  his vision of a modernised Britain is based  on
government  harnessing  private  finance and  working  closely  with
companies.
Words  are  cheap, but the rhetoric has been matched by  appropriate
policy  actions. One policy that was signalled before the  election,
and  one that was something of a suprise, make this clear,  although
one  policy  experience  after  the election  found  the  government
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accused  of flirting with the old-style corporatism it has avowed to
avoid.
An  important part of the repackaging of new Labour was to  overturn
the  traditional  image  of  Labour  as a  'tax  and  spend'  party.
Recently  revealed  public  documents show that in  the  1960s,  the
Labour Government saw increasing the public share of national income
as  an explicit policy goal. In contrast, new Labour pledged that it
would  adhere  to  the  spending  commitments  of  its  Conservative
predecessors  for  its  first  two years in  office.  Adjusting  for
inflation  at 1996-7 prices, public expenditure peaked in real terms
in  1995-6  at  262  billion. The 1997-8  planning  total  is  258.8
billion and that for 1998-9 258.1 billion.
A  key  policy change introduced immediately after the election  was
the  decision  to  give  the Bank's new  monetary  policy  committee
control  over  the setting of interest rates. A key policy lever  is
thus transferred away from the government to a setting more amenable
to  global  economic  forces.  The  main  argument  for  moving  the
responsibility  for  fixing  interest  rates is that  they  are  too
important  a  policy instrument to be left to politicians.  Monetary
policy  needs  to be insulated from political influence in a  global
economy.  It  is  hoped  that the  monetary  policy  committee  will
establish  credibility  with the markets, thus conferring  a  global
blessing  on  the Blair Government as one that respects, and  is  in
tune with, market forces.
The  difficulties  of the privatized coal industry showed,  however,
that  the  Government is vulnerable to short run pressures from  its
client  groups. This episode cannot be dwelt on at length here,  and
it  is  by  no  means complete. In brief, the  biggest  coal  mining
company  in Britain indicated that the closure of one colliery  cold
be  followed  by the closure of the majority of its pits. The  Union
of  Democratic Mineworkers tried to cash in its rain check with  the
government.  The  initial response of the government was robust  and
could have been made by the Conservatives: there were no IOUs to the
unions; it was not the job of government to intervene in the market;
the  matter was one for the commercial company involved which should
price its product more realistically.
The  deputy  prime  minister,  John  Prescott,  called  for  a  more
interventionist  approach and in December the Prime Minister prmised
that  there  would be a deal between the coal company and the  three
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big  electricity  generators which would stop pit closures  for  six
months.  Quite  what the deal was was unclear, but it appeared  that
the  generators  would buy excess capacity and in return  would  get
generous treatment under competition legislation or an easing of the
vigilance  of regulation. If this was the deal, then it sat ill with
the  government's devotion to the market and led to press  criticism
of  'corporatist fudge and government hand outs'. (Financial  Times,
13  December  1997).  In fact, one solution  that  did  subsequently
emrege from talks between one of the generators and the coal company
was   far   more   market   oriented.   Householders,   particularly
those in current and past coal mining areas, will be able to sign an
electricity  supply contract for coal fired electricity. The  number
of  contracts  signed would then be reflected in the amount of  coal
bought  by the generator. The most recent indications (May 1998) are
that   the   government   is  contemplating  of  taking   the   more
interventionist  step of imposed a moratorium on the construction of
gas fired power stations in the name of an 'energy security' policy.
The  third  condition  of a successful domestic policy  response  to
globalization  is  offering  citizens some  protection  against  the
harsher  aspects  of  the international market. The  government  has
advanced the notion of a 'third way' between the social democracy of
the  'old  left' and the neoliberalism of the 'new right'. The  most
authoritative statement to date of what this means has been provided
by  Anthony  Giddens, the Director of the LSE who acts as a kind  of
informal  court  intellectual  for the Blair  Government.  (Giddens,
1998).  It  is not possible to summarize his arguments in the  space
available  here,  but three need noting. First, what he  terms  'the
new  mixed  economy'  refers 'to a balance  between  regulation  and
deregulation;  and between the economic and non-economic in the life
of  the  society.'  (Giddens,  1998,  p.19).  Second,  globalization
leads  to  a softening of borders which revert to  being  frontiers.
This  means 'a nation sure enough of itself to accept the new limits
to   sovereignty'  (Giddens,  1998,  p.20).  Third,  'Some  of   the
criticisms  offered  by  the new right about the welfare  state  are
valid.' (Giddens, 1998, p.20). It needs to be reformed not to cut it
back but to make it more responsive to changed circumstances.
The  Blair  Government  does face a dilemma in the  area  of  social
protection.  It  does  have a general strategy which is to  try  and
forge  in  Europe a third way between what is seen as  the  historic
over-regulation  of  labour  markets in Europe  and  the  unfettered
market  and insecurity seen to exist in the US. Making headway  with
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this   idea   at  the  European  level  is  difficult  enough,   but
domestically  the government faces the dilemma of, on the one  hand,
having  promised  to severely restrain public expenditure to  retain
the faith of the markets and, on the other hand, having promised the
electors  better  health  care  and  schools in  order  to  win  the
election.
The government's way out of this dilemma is to 'rebuild' the welfare
state  which  is  the dominant element in  public  expenditure.  The
government  rhetoric is that the welfare state has failed and  needs
to  be  reconstructed.  The first steps along this  route,  reducing
benefits  to lone parents, led to considerable controversy. This  is
not  surprising if one considers that ten years ago the notion  that
one  of the first actions of a Labour Government would be to cut the
benefits  of  a  disadvantaged group in society  would  have  seemed
absurd.  Even  more  trouble  can be expected  if  and  when  global
imperatives confront the disabled. There are good grounds for asking
whether  the rapidly spiralling budget for disabled benefits is well
spent,  but  demonstrations  by individuals in  wheelchairs  provide
compelling  visual images. The real storm will occur if and when the
government  tackles  universal benefits like child benefits and  the
state  pension,  options which are evidently on the agenda.  Limited
public  funds  need  to  be redirected to  activities  more  closely
related  to  global competitiveness such as education, but those  on
already inadequate state pensions are not likely to see it that way.
The theory of a market economy, or more specific innovations such as
changes  in the way in which interest rates are set, are  relatively
remote  from  the  lives of most people and government  can  appease
global  forces  in  those areas without having to  pay  a  political
price.  The scenario becomes rather different when the focus  shifts
to  benefits received by at least one member of most families. It is
then   that  the  crunch  occurs  between  the  economic  forces  of
globalization  and  the preferences of individual citizens with  the
national  government  seeking to act as an intermediary. The  result
may  be  continuing  diversities in provision from  one  country  to
another  but  this is not the kind of diversity that fascinates  the
comparative political economists.
Conclusions: moving the agenda forward
The  real  disagreement the writer has with some of the  comparative
political  economists  is that they acknowledge  globalization,  but
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fail  to  recognise the extent to which regionalisation might  be  a
countervailing  power  (not to mention diversities protected at  the
subnational  level).  Streeck  fears that what is happening  at  the
European level is the reproduction of some parts of the German model
(such  as  institutionalised monetarism) without those parts of  the
model  which  offer necessary social and institutional  correctives.
(Streeck,  1997, p.52). It is a powerful argument, but there may  be
more grounds for confidence about the institution building potential
of  the  EU than Streeck allows, particularly if it can become  less
preoccupied with the defence of marginal European farmers.
Even  more  effective regional institutions are, by themselves,  not
enough.  There  is a democratic deficit at the global  level.  Quite
how  it might be filled is difficult to predict, particularly  given
that  the political orientation of citizens remains predominantly at
the  national  and  subnational levels. Strange  sees  transnational
social  movements as offering some potential and there are certainly
a   number   which  now  operate  globally.  However,  they   remain
relatively  immature  organisations. International firms may  assume
governance  roles,  but although they are  organizationally  mature,
this  is  offset  by  a  lack  of  legitimacy.  In  the  short  run,
institutionalized negotiation and more effective enforcement regimes
offered by bodies such as the World Trade Organization may offer the
best  way  forward. At a European level, there is a need to  develop
the  institutional  capacities of the European Union in a way  which
citizens can relate to.
There  is an important agenda to be addressed. National  diversities
will   not  disappear,  although,  as  Strange  suggests,   sectoral
diversities may be as important. Unfortunately, some analysts in the
comparative   political  economy  school  have a  predisposition  to
celebrate  the  virtues of particular national models,  rather  than
considering   how   those  models  might  best  adjust  to   a   new
international  setting. One can build on Hall's work to suggest that
there  is an interesting set of questions about how one can maintain
the  better features of non-economic coordination arrangements in an
era when globalization, broadly conceived, is a major force.
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